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Two Sides of COIN

Toward Successful COIN:
Shining Path’s Decline
Darren Colby
©2021 Darren Colby

ABSTRACT: The rapid decline of the Peruvian left-wing insurgent
organization Sendero Luminoso was not only the result of the
arrest of its leader. An analysis of the precipitous weakening of the
organization using two social movement theories finds other factors
were involved in the demise of the organization as well. These
factors—participatory politics, support for the military among
the rural population, and alienation of the population by Sendero
Luminoso—provide insights to effective counterinsurgency tactics.

L

eading scholarship on the decline of the Peruvian left-wing
insurgent movement Sendero Luminoso (SL) attributes the
group’s eventual weakening to the loss of its charismatic leader.1
While the arrest of the group’s leader may be one reason for its dramatic
virtual defeat, this article engages two social movement theories—statecentric and framing—to argue decapitation alone cannot account for
SL’s decline. Three factors in particular account for the weakening of
Sendero Luminoso: 1) the participatory nature of Peruvian politics
provided citizens with left-wing ideologies the ability to exercise political
power without resorting to violence; 2) the military was moderately
successful at building credibility with and separating peasants from SL;
and 3) SL alienated potential supporters. These circumstances combined
to ensure the group’s effectiveness and influence would rapidly wane
with the arrest of its charismatic leader. Throughout this article, SL will
be conceptualized as a social movement—a group engaged in collective
action to achieve a particular goal. Sendero Luminoso, however, will
also alternately be referred to as an insurgency—a particular type of
social movement engaged in “subversion and violence to seize, nullify,
or challenge political control of a region,” and a terrorist group—an
organization that “instill[s] fear and coerce[s] individuals, governments
or societies” to achieve its goals.2

1. Robert B. Kent, “Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru,”
Geographical Review 83, no. 4 (Oct. 1993): 441–54; Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton,
“Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy,” Third World Quarterly 12, no. 2 (April
1990): 21–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599008420232; and Michael L. Burgoyne, “The Allure
of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s Fight against Sendero Luminoso,” Military Review XC, no. 5
(September–October 2010): 68–73.
2. Department of Defense (DoD), DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, s.v.
“insurgency,” (Washington, DC: DoD, January 2021), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents
/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf; and DOD Dictionary, s.v. “terrorism.”
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Background

In 1970, a charismatic philosophy professor named Abimael
Guzmán founded SL at San Cristóbal of Huamanga National University
in the city of Ayacucho. The name Sendero Luminoso, which translates
to shining path, is a reference to the writings of José Carlos Mariátegui.
Mariátegui proposed replacing Peru’s feudal land ownership system
with a socialist agrarian system that would not subordinate indigenous
sharecroppers to a minority of mestizo landowners.3 Mariátegui referred
to the path from sharecropping to socialism as the Shining Path, which
Guzmán used as the name for his insurgency. The group referred to its
philosophy as “Gonzalo Thought” in honor of Guzmán’s nom de guerre,
Comrade Gonzalo, and in addition to Mariátegui, it drew inspiration
from the writings of Karl Marx and Mao Zedong. Gonzalo Thought
advocated for imposing a communist dictatorship in a Maoist-style
campaign originating in Peru’s countryside.
On May 17, 1980, residents of Chuschi, Peru, went to vote after the
transition from a military to a civilian regime and found SL had burned
ballot boxes.4 Following this initial act of rebellion and while President
Fernando Belaúnde Terry’s administration still underestimated its
strength, SL quickly gained territory, employed indiscriminate violence,
and assassinated public officials and members of moderate left-wing
political parties. In 1982, Belaúnde deployed the army and marines to
set up emergency zones. Under his and the subsequent administrations
of Alan García and Alberto Fujimori, the military and police acted
with little restraint. Most violence occurred before Guzmán’s arrest and
SL’s rapid atrophy in 1992 and resulted in over 69,000 deaths caused by
both sides.5

Leadership Decapitation

Some scholars contend the decline of SL came about because the
group could not function without its charismatic leader, finding positive
links between leadership decapitation and the mortality of terrorist
organizations including Sendero Luminoso.6 Other scholars argue the
unpredictability of leadership succession in war makes it difficult to
identify leadership decapitation as the reason for a group’s weakening, or
they propose the removal of a group’s leadership is outright ineffective

3. José Carlos Mariátegui, Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, rev. ed., trans. Marjory
Urquidi (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), 22–61.
4. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth Commission: Peru 01, July 13, 2001 to August 28,
2003, https://www.usip.org/publications/2001/07/truth-commission-peru-01.
5. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Peru 01.
6. Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 14–34; Bryan C. Price, “Targeting Top
Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” International Security
36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 9–46; and Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the
Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security 36, no.
4 (Spring 2012): 47–79, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076.

Two Sides of COIN

Colby

37

against terrorist organizations with bureaucratic structures and high
levels of popular support.7
An important limitation to the statistical analysis that is implied but
never mentioned in the literature is that any causal link between leader
decapitation and the survival of terrorist organizations only applies to
the aggregate level. Given the possible range of ideologies, organizational
structures, and resources available to terrorist organizations across
geographies and time, it is impossible to say if a single case of leadership
decapitation, such as the arrest of Guzmán, fits the aggregate-level
findings. Moreover, while leadership decapitation may increase the
likelihood terrorist groups will cease to exist, such an increase is no
guarantee this will happen.
Even in studies that found leadership decapitation increased the
likelihood a terrorist organization would be eliminated, other factors
almost certainly influenced the amount by which the likelihood of
such an outcome increased. Some scholarship determined leadership
decapitation was effective against SL, but these studies also suggest if
terrorist organizations can weather the period of turmoil immediately
following the loss of key leaders, they can regroup and continue to be
viable. “Sendero has failed to revive itself as an ideological organization,
although a blossoming connection to cocaine trafficking has some
Peruvian officials worried the group could become a resurgent threat.”8
Similarly, a survival analysis model shows the mortality of terrorist
organizations that suffer leadership decapitation decreases over time as
the organization continues to exist.9
At the time of Guzmán’s capture, SL had been in existence 22 years
and had been fighting for 12 of those years, making it more likely to
survive than a younger insurgency. Since at least 2002, SL has been
increasing its cocaine trafficking and attacks on the military, which
suggests SL survived Guzmán’s capture and successfully reorganized.10
Although there is an undeniable link between the survival of terrorist
groups and leadership decapitation, this link alone is insufficient to
account for SL’s decline. Among others, the example of the Taliban in
Afghanistan and its continued survival after significant leadership losses
calls into question the notion leadership decapitation alone guarantees a
terrorist organization’s downfall, including that of Sendero Luminoso.

Social Movement Theories

While political scientists have examined variations in the types
and causes of insurgent violence, this article examines SL as a social
7. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996), 55–87; and Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist
Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 7–38, https://
doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00157.
8. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 20.
9. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 43.
10. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Peru: Shining Path–Slowly Regrouping (Washington, DC:
National Intelligence Council, August 3, 2003).
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movement—a group of people engaged in collective action through
formal organization to achieve a goal.11 Although the Shining Path
is often referred to as a terrorist or insurgent group, terrorism and
insurgency, as defined above, align with the definition of a social
movement. Two theories of social movement explain revolutions—social
movements that replace existing power structures as SL tried to do—in
terms of the political participation of opposition groups and the ability
of movements to craft narratives that resonate with potential recruits.
The state-centric view posits revolutions should fail in systems
that allow citizen participation in politics and succeed in personalistic
regimes that do not afford citizens political power.12 But these polities
do not have to be democracies: some scholars find revolution to be
unlikely in semi-authoritarian regimes that maintain some ability for
opposition groups to participate and address grievances within the
political system.13 Whereas the only option to exercise political power
in a personalistic regime is through violence, an open political system
enables potential guerrillas to exercise political power within the existing
system.14 Moreover, the behavior of such regimes can enable revolutions:
the regime in question can marginalize the very elites whose support it
needs to remain in power, or by intentionally weakening the military to
avoid a coup, the regime can diminish military capabilities to the point
its armed forces are unable to quell a rebellion.15
A weakness of the state-centric view is that it does not afford agency
to individuals. In contrast, framing theorists emphasize the importance
of how leaders of social movements can deliver their messages, through
words and actions, to garner support.16 They argue revolutionary
movements cannot gain materiel support or sow discontent without
using effective messaging to attract this support or change opinions.17
Framing theory holds individuals have an attitude toward an object—a
policy or action—that constitutes the sum of their beliefs about that
object. Different individuals may have different criteria that shape their
beliefs, and those criteria constitute a frame. If a social movement can
craft its message in a way that changes peoples’ frames, it can change
11. Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence
from Chechnya,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (June 2009): 331–62, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0022002708330881; Laia Balcells, “Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians
in Conventional Civil Wars,” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 2 (June 2010): 291–313, https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00588.x; Reed M Wood, “Rebel Capability and Strategic
Violence against Civilians,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (September 2010): 601–14, https://doi
.org/10.1177/0022343310376473; and Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their
Implications for Policy,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), 26.
12. Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 25.
13. Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third
World,” Politics & Society 17, no. 4 (December 1989): 495.
14. Goodwin and Skocpol, “Explaining Revolutions,” 493.
15. Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in
Middle Eastern Autocracies,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 10.
16. David A. Snow, “Framing and Social Movements,” in The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social
and Political Movements, ed. David A. Snow et al. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 2.
17. Snow, “Framing and Social Movements,” 3.
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their attitudes and, in turn, their willingness to support or join the
movement. According to this perspective, in order to be successful,
a movement must craft a message that inspires people to view that
movement positively.18
In addition to theoretical arguments, more recent work on the role
of messaging in social movements has taken advantage of the availability
of quantitative data to provide more concrete evidence of the link
between framing and the success or failure of social movements. In
a study of insurgent group networks and their attitudes toward their
targets, researchers, using a news database, found evidence that rhetoric
emanating from leaders of insurgent groups was associated with the
political entities these groups were fighting against.19 Using data from
Twitter, another study showed how misinformation from right-wing
news sites changed peoples’ opinions ahead of the 2016 presidential
election.20 A third, survey-based study found some rebel movements
positively influenced observers’ attitudes about them by using a gendered
frame to highlight females’ contributions to the movement’s goals.21

Sendero Luminoso as a Social Movement

Both social movement theories—state-centric and framing—help
explain the decline of SL. The state-centric perspective explains how
systemic factors—democratization and the availability of peaceful
alternatives within the political system and improving civil-military
relations—pulled people away from Sendero Luminoso. The framing
model shows how an individual-level factor—lack of popular support—
pushed potential guerrillas away from SL. These circumstances
combined to ensure Sendero Luminoso's organization would be a
glasshouse easily broken and requiring years to reassemble.

Democratization and Peaceful Alternatives
From 1968 to 1980, Peruvians who embraced left-wing ideologies had
options to exercise political power within an increasingly democratic
system instead of joining SL. During this period, Peru was ruled by a
military junta that gradually built open political institutions, “peasant
federations, and rural cooperatives.”22 These initiatives cultivated
a well-organized polity committed to social reform, incorporating
18. Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, “Framing Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science
10, no. 1 (June 2007): 104, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054.
19. Michael Gabbay and Ashley Thirkill-Mackelprang, “A Quantitative Analysis of Insurgent
Frames, Claims, and Networks in Iraq,” (American Political Science Association (APSA) 2011 Annual
Meeting Paper, APSA, 2011): 37, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900770.
20. Yochai Benkler et al., “Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered Broader
Media Agenda,” Columbia Journalism Review, March 3, 2017, 14.
21. Devorah Manekin and Reed M. Wood, “Framing the Narrative: Female Fighters, External
Audience Attitudes, and Transnational Support for Armed Rebellions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
64, no. 9 (2020): 1638–65.
22. Susan C. Bourque and Kay B. Warren, “Democracy without Peace: The Cultural Politics
of Terror in Peru,” Latin American Research Review 24, no. 1 (1989): 7–34; and James Ron, “Ideology
in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation,” Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 5
(September 2001): 579.

40

Parameters 51(2) Summer 2021

left-wing groups into the political system, most of which merged into
the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and United Left
(IU).23 Democratic reform reached a crescendo with the transition to
civilian rule in 1980.
After the transition to democracy, Peruvian politics became
increasingly open to Marxist-leaning opposition groups, and the success
of the APRA and IU illuminated a less violent and more desirable
alternative to Sendero Luminoso. During Belaúnde’s administration,
parties of all stripes mobilized and ran for public office. Congress was
comprised primarily of IU and APRA politicians, who won a combined
67 percent of the popular vote in national parliamentary elections in
1985 and had similar outcomes at the municipal level.24 “Unlike the
Sandinistas or the FMLN, a Sendero victory was rarely viewed by
commentators on the left or the right as an improvement over the
existing Peruvian regime, deeply flawed as it was.”25
While this history paints an optimistic picture of Peruvian politics,
skeptics may point to unpopular structural readjustments to the
economy, human rights violations caused by the military, and low public
approval ratings.26 It is also true that after taking office in 1990, Fujimori
censored the press, allowed the military to detain citizens arbitrarily,
and created secret courts to try insurgents. In 1992, he sent the military
into the streets of Lima, dissolved congressional and judicial powers,
and ruled by presidential decree. While these actions dealt a severe blow
to democratization, they received considerable public approval and did
not force citizens to resort to insurgency to exercise political power. For
example, one 1992 poll showed 73 percent of respondents supported
Fujimori’s actions, and two months later, that approval rating had
increased to 83 percent.27 Less than a year after the coup, Fujimori called
a constitutional referendum and restored legislative and judicial powers.

Improving Civil-Military Relations
Improving civil-military relations also helped pull would-be
guerrillas into peaceful political organizations. At the end of the 1980s,
the Belaúnde and Fujimori administrations pursued a more populationcentric counterinsurgency strategy, codified in the Peruvian army
manual Unconventional Countersubversion Warfare, ME 14-7. The manual
directed the military to organize civilians into rondas (patrols) to fight
the insurgents and to refrain from using indiscriminate violence. The

23. Bourque and Warren, “Democracy without Peace,” 16.
24. Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 584.
25. Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 571.
26. Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru (Santa Monica CA: RAND
Corporation, 1990).
27. María Teresa Quiroz, “Medios de comunicación y opinión política de los jóvenes en la
ciudad de Lima, (coyuntura del 5 de abril de 1992),” Contratexto, no. 7 (January 2, 1994): 133, https://
revistas.ulima.edu.pe/index.php/contratexto/article/view/1943/1945.
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manual also required the military to pay fair prices for items it acquired
from civilians and respect their “fundamental rights.”28
Some high-level commanders implemented the population-centric
approach and saw considerable success. After assuming command of
the Upper Huallaga Valley, Brigadier General Alberto Arciniega Huby
quickly realized indiscriminate violence “did not lead to favorable results”
and ordered antidrug police not to “engage in repressive operations
against coca growers.”29 Huby gained support with coca growers by
telling them he realized selling coca was their only way to eke out a
living and “they were not considered delinquents but participants in the
informal sector.”30 Though likely exaggerated, Huby recounts after that
meeting, the coca growers fought alongside the army in 60 battles and
killed 1,000 SL members.31
The city of Ayacucho also experienced some success in improving
civil-military relations. In 1990, US officials visited Ayacucho and
concluded the number of deaths and disappearances by the military
and police had decreased.32 Ayacucho’s district attorney and the special
prosecutor for human rights spoke of increased cooperation from the
army in prosecuting human rights violations, and others, including the
local Catholic bishop, spoke of General Petronio Fernandez-Davila
Carnero’s efforts to improve civil-military relations.33 Similarly, during
a SL strike in Ayacucho City, the police abstained from repression
because they believed such behavior would elicit SL retaliation
against civilians.34
Aside from reducing indiscriminate violence, the military began to
work closely with the communities it protected. The military established,
trained, and equipped rondas in indigenous communities and began
distributing shotguns to them in 1991. The following year, Fujimori
codified the rights of these citizens to bear arms into the constitution.
This action had a symbolic effect because Peruvian law had prohibited
indigenous people from owning firearms since the colonial period.35

Lack of Popular Support
Sendero Luminoso alienated potential supporters in words and
actions. It used slogans such as, “if we do not understand Maoism as the
28. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, “Tomo II,” 287–89, https://www.usip.org/sites
/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Peru01-Report/Peru01-Report_Vol2.pdf.
29. Alberto Arciniega Huby, “Civil-Military Relations and a Democratic Peru,” trans. Patricia
Radu and Michael Radu, Orbis 38, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 115.
30. Huby, “Civil-Military Relations,” 116.
31. Huby, “Civil-Military Relations,” 116.
32. US Embassy Lima, In the Eye of the Storm: An Ayacucho Trip Report, Part I (Lima, Peru: US
Embassy Lima, December 20, 1990), 4, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB64
/peru25.pdf.
33. US Embassy Lima, Ambassador’s Human Rights Calls in Ayacucho (Lima, Peru: US Embassy
Lima, December 11, 1990), 8–9, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB64/peru23.pdf.
34. US Embassy Lima, In the Eye, 5.
35. Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes.”
in Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru 1980–1995, ed. Steve J. Stern (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1998), 224–258, https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822398059-010.
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new, third and higher stage of Marxism, it is impossible to understand
anything.” Instead of linking its cause with the marginalization of
indigenous people by the state or highlighting the rural-urban divide,
Gonzalo Thought reduced the plight of rural indigenous communities to
class warfare.36 Initially, SL received reluctant support from indigenous
peasants marginalized by exploitative sharecropping arrangements and
racism because the organization provided education and redistributed
land from wealthy plantation owners.37
But the movement lost the allegiance of the indigenous population
by forcibly replacing indigenous leaders with its own leaders, forcing
farmers not to grow crops, banning indigenous social and religious
practices, and enslaving some indigenous people.38 In areas controlled by
Sendero Luminoso, residents faced brutal punishments for infractions
such as adultery, drunkenness, and complaining about the movement.39
Some communities formed rondas, but SL violently retaliated. In the village
of Lucanamarca, SL insurgents hacked up approximately 70 peasants
with machetes and hatchets and attacked other left-wing groups.40
Though indigenous communities bore the brunt of SL violence, the
group did not attack these communities out of racial or ethnic hatred
but instead attacked them to achieve the goal of installing a communist
dictatorship. A key pillar in Gonzalo Thought was the notion that
“human rights are contradictory to the rights of the people.” Using brutal
tactics against innocent civilians was therefore necessary and justified.41
Accordingly, SL assassinated an official from the US embassy, stoned a
ronda commander to death in Lucanamarca, and killed dogs and hung
them from telephone poles in Lima.42
Moreover, Guzmán denounced President García, the IU mayor of
Lima, and the Soviet Union, and SL assassinated leaders in other leftwing organizations.43 Between 1983 and 1992, the group assassinated
268 union leaders, politicians, and community organizers that could
36. James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2020) 31–36.
37. Lewis Taylor, Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980–1997 (Liverpool,
UK: Liverpool University Press, 2006).
38. Lewis Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War
in Peru, 1980–1996,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 17, no. 1 (January 1998): 35–58; and “Peru
Rescues 39 ‘Slave Workers’ from Shining Path Farm,” BBC News, July 28, 2015.
39. Carlos Ivan Degregori, “A Dwarf Star,” North American Conference on Latin America Report on
the Americas 24, no. 4 (December 1990): 14–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.1990.11723187.
40. Edward Schumacher, “Insurgency in Peru: The Unarmed Are Dying,” New York Times,
June 8, 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/08/world/insurgency-in-peru-the-unarmed-are
-dying.html.
41. Author translation; original: Partida Comunista de Perú, “Sobre Las Dos Colinas:
Documento de Estudio Para El Balance de La III Campaña,” 1991, http://www.cedema.org/ver.
php?id=699.
42. Degregori, “A Dwarf Star,” 11.
43. Author translation; original: Partido Comunista de Peru—Sendero Luminoso, “Línea de
Construcción de los Tres Instrumentos de la Revolución,” 1988, http://www.solrojo.org/pcp_doc
/pcp_lpg.ci.htm; and José Luis Rénique, “Apogee and Crisis of a ‘Third Path’: Mariateguismo,
‘People’s War,’ and Counterinsurgency in Puno, 1987–1994,” in Shining and Other Paths: War and Society
in Peru, 1980–1995, ed. Steve J. Stern (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 318, https://doi
.org/10.1215/9780822398059-010.
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have been supporters.44 Members also assassinated journalists from
Lima that could have helped SL gain support.45 Ultimately, without
a political system to repress people to the point they would support
Sendero Luminoso and without an effective strategy to gain new
supporters, the capture of Guzmán dealt a serious, though not deadly,
blow to the movement.

Recommendations

Drawing on the analysis above, this section proposes three
recommendations essential to successful counterinsurgency: building
and strengthening civil society organizations, improving civil-military
relations, and driving a wedge between insurgents and potential recruits.
These recommendations are intended to deprive insurgents of their
ability to generate popular support and thus differ from traditional
counterterrorist operations undertaken to prevent the successful
employment of terrorist tactics.

Civil Society Organizations
The participatory nature of the political system and the presence of
civil society organizations gives citizens the ability to exercise political
power without resorting to violence. In situations where a robust civil
society exists during an insurgency, counterinsurgents should work with
civil society leaders to strengthen these organization and their appeal
to potential guerrillas and to moderates within the rebel movement
itself. If a functional civil society is nonexistent during an insurgency,
counterinsurgents must identify influential people to build civil society
organizations that can function as alternatives to taking up arms against
the state.
Although counterinsurgents are generally military or police forces,
diplomatic and development organizations such as the Department of
State, the United States Agency for International Development, and the
National Endowment for Democracy, or their international equivalents,
are better suited to execute and coordinate counterinsurgent efforts
working in concert with military and police operations.46 Indeed,
building and strengthening civil society organizations without military
operations will not resolve an insurgency and may facilitate insurgent
assassinations by making more identifiable targets. (Just such a scenario
resulted in the SL killings of APRA and IU leaders.) But as was the case
in the ethnic conflict in Serbia (1991–99), separatists clashes in Northern
Ireland (1968–98), the anticommunist struggle in Nicaragua (1981–90),
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front insurgency in the Philippines

44. Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 583.
45. Bourque and Warren, “Democracy without Peace,” 21.
46. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Interorganizational Cooperation, Joint Publication 3-08
(Washington, DC: JCS, October 16, 2017), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine
/pubs/jp3_08pa.pdf ?ver=2018-02-08-091414-467.
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(1977–2014), civil society organizations can have a pacifying effect that
complements military and police operations.47

Civil-Military Relations
The military’s shift to population-centric counterinsurgency,
restraint against wanton violence, and the creation of rondas helped
boost its credibility and legitimacy in the emergency zones it controlled.
With greater credibility and legitimacy, the military was able to win
over peasants and more selectively target SL insurgents. Improving
civil-military relations by refraining from indiscriminate violence and
building relationships with civilians isolates civilians from insurgents
and makes targeting insurgents easier. For example, Dotan Haim found
civilian aid in the Philippines was more effective at countering insurgent
influence and reducing violence in villages where civilians perceived the
army as being a more credible institution than in villages where the army
had less credibility.48
Practically, counterinsurgents will often be a mix of local security
forces and foreign military forces that provide training and logistical
support to the local force, as is the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. In
such cases, foreign counterinsurgents should train local forces to build
positive relationships with civilians and condition support for these
forces on refraining from indiscriminately targeting civilians. When only
one country’s security forces act as counterinsurgents, they should gain
credibility by liaising with civilians, protecting the civilian population
from insurgent violence, and minimizing civilian casualties.

Insurgents and Potential Recruits
Counterinsurgents should also deprive insurgents of potential
support. Sendero Luminoso was unable to garner popular support
because its rigid ideology and brutal tactics alienated the population
from which it needed support.49 When rebels use brutal tactics against
civilians, counterinsurgents should capitalize on the opportunity to
portray the rebels in a negative light.
Counterinsurgents can also exploit differences in ethnicity, religion,
social strata, or economic class between insurgents and their support
base. Recent research demonstrates the least inclusive armies have been
the least effective because they sow distrust and infighting; there is no
reason to think this would not also be the case with rebel movements.50
To create and highlight divisions between rebels and potential
supporters, public affairs, psychological operations, public diplomacy,
47. Catherine Barnes, Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace,
Issue Paper 2 (European Centre for Conflict Prevention/International Secretariat of the Global
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, September 2006), https://www.gppac.net
/files/2018-11/Agents%20for%20Change.pdf.
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and information operations experts must work together to identify
differences between insurgents and their support base and develop a
coherent messaging campaign to highlight those differences.

Conclusion

One of the most popular explanations for the decline of Sendero
Luminoso is that the group was ineffective without its charismatic
leader. But leadership decapitation theory does not fully account for
this decline because the evidence for leadership decapitation generalizes
across space and time. Such broad generalization ignores the political
and social contexts that lead to the decline of individual groups such as
the Shining Path. Accordingly, leadership decapitation does not explain
why SL could not survive without Guzmán, only that it could not survive
without him. Social movement theory instead provides a more thorough
explanation for the group’s sudden demise.
State-centric theory maintains revolutionary movements are
unlikely to prevail in political systems where citizens can exercise
political power without resorting to insurgency, and framing theory
emphasizes the importance of the messaging rebels use to gain support.
Peru offered citizens who embraced left-wing ideologies the ability to
exercise political power. The country had been democratizing since
1968, there were political parties with Marxist orientations, and starting
in 1990, the military worked to improve civil-military relations. Sendero
Luminoso itself failed to attract the support of citizens because of
the rhetoric and brutality it employed against other leftist groups and
against indigenous communities. To be successful in future conflicts,
counterinsurgents must build and strengthen civil society organizations,
improve civil-military relations, and drive a wedge between insurgents
and their popular support.

